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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
commencement of construction, making it originally effective
as a blanket lien against the whole property, but that upon
filing of the condominium declaration it became effective
against the individual units within the meaning of the statute,
with the result that each unit owner was liable only for a pro-
portionate share.
The critical time, the court ruled, is the date of commence-
ment of foreclosure proceedings and the filing of a lis pendens
against the property. So long as the condominium declaration
is filed before foreclosure proceedings are commenced, section
703.09 applies and each owner is liable only for his proportion-
ate share. However, if the foreclosure is started before the dec-
laration is filed, "the situation is frozen so that the subsequent
recording of a declaration does not transform the blanket lien
into a proportional lien on individual units. ' 37
The court explained its ruling by saying that foreclosure is
an equitable proceeding and it is patently inequitable to charge
individual unit owners with liability for the full value of a lien
against the entire property.
MARY F. WYANT
TAXATION AND TRUSTS AND ESTATES
I. ACCRUED LIABILITIES
In Wisconsin, corporations are allowed to deduct from their
gross income compensation paid to employees for services ren-
dered.' Frequently, in addition to the employees' regular
wages, companies will also pay bonuses and vacation pay, or
both. When these payments have been made in good faith, and
as additional compensation, they are likewise deductible.'
Ladish Co. v. Department of Revenue3 involved a situation
where an accrual basis calendar year corporation was denied a
37. 73 Wis. 2d at 115, 242 N.W.2d at 898.
1. Wis. STAT. § 71.04(1)(1973).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-9 (1958); McCoy-Brandt Mach. Co., 8 B.T.A. 909 (1927)
(acq.); I.R.C. § 463.
3. 69 Wis. 2d 723, 233 N.W.2d 354 (1975).
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deduction for accrued vacation pay.'
The labor contract which obligated the company to make
the vacation payments provided that the vacation earning pe-
riod for employees was from April 1st of one year through
March 31st of the next. The contract also provided that if an
employee quit or was discharged for cause prior to April 1st, his
entire vacation pay would be forfeited. For each of the years
1964 through 1967, Ladish deducted from its gross income an
amount reflecting vacation pay which accrued during the first
three months of the calendar year as well as that which accrued
during the last nine months. The former amount was the
amount which vested in the employees on April 1st. The latter
amount, however, had neither vested nor been paid during that
year and was subject to the forfeiture provision in the labor
contract.5 The Wisconsin Department of Revenue disallowed
the non-vested portions of the deductions.'
At issue was whether the vacation pay which had theoreti-
cally accrued during the last nine months of each year had in
fact accrued and was therefore deductible at the end of the
calendar year.7 The court noted that accruability rested not
with the certainty of payment but with the certainty of the
obligation arising. To determine whether an obligation of pay-
ment had arisen the court adopted the so-called "all events"
test.' Under this test, for an allowable deduction to occur, all
events which establish the taxpayer's liability for a specific
item must have occurred before the end of the tax year.
In the instant case, the court stressed that Ladish's liability
for vacation pay was contingent upon the individual employees
4. Generally, Wis. STAT. § 71.02(1)(c)(1973) permits accrual basis taxpayers to
deduct accrued expenses in computing their taxable income.
5. Ladish's accounting method deducted from income vacation pay accruing the
last nine months of the taxable year. Any difference between the deduction and the
actual payment in the succeeding year was returned to income in that year. Although
this method was in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, the
court held that fact was not controlling for Wisconsin income tax purposes and that
the proper question was whether or not the company's accounting method clearly
reflected its income. See Wis. STAT. § 71.11(8)(a) (1973).
6. Amounts disallowed in one year were deductible in the next. Thus, during the
period in question, some years resulted in an increase in taxable income and others in
a decrease in taxable income.
7. Wis. STAT. § 71.04(7) (1973) provides in material part:"... reserves for contin-
gent losses or liabilities shall not be deducted."
8. The "all events" test is said to have arisen in United States v. Andersen, 269
U.S. 422 (1926).
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not quitting or being discharged for cause before March 31st.
The court thus held irrelevant the fact that the amount of
vacation pay annually forfeited was less than one percent of the
accrued vacation pay since all the events which fixed the com-
pany's liability had clearly not occurred prior to the year end.9
Although Ladish Company lost the accruability issue, it did
successfully argue that by changing the time when its vacation
pay became deductible the court necessarily changed Ladish's
method of accounting. Ladish was thus entitled to a vacation
pay deduction. Under Wisconsin Statutes section 71.11(8)(b)'0
a taxpayer can offset a 1953 accrual for specific line items
against the same item in any year in which its method of ac-
counting is changed." Ladish thus argued that it should be
allowed an offset on its 1964 tax return for the accrual of 1953
vacation pay.
In interpreting this complex statute, the Wisconsin court
relied heavily on the interpretation of a parallel Internal Reve-
nue Code section. 2 To trigger application of section 71.11(8)(b)
9. Actually, the amount forfeited was only given for the taxable year ending De-
cember 31, 1967. Of the $855,314.38 of vacation pay which was accrued on that date
only $3,645.98 was returned the next year.
10. WIS. STAT. § 71.11(8)(b) (1973) provides:
(b) In computing a corporation's taxable income for any taxable year,
commencing after December 31, 1953, if such computation is under a method
of accounting different from the method under which the taxpayer's taxable
income for the preceding taxable year was computed, then there shall be taken
into account those adjustments which are determined to be necessary solely by
reason of the change in order to prevent amounts from being duplicated or
omitted, except there shall not be taken into account any adjustment in respect
of any taxable year to which this section does not apply and except that this
rule shall not modify or change the rule as to federal income and excess on its
taxes set forth in s. 71.02(1)(c).
11. The reason for permitting adjustment based on the year 1953 is that the present
statutory scheme came into being in 1954 and the legislature decided to start fresh for
years following 1953. The applicable language within section 71.11(8)(b) is ". . . ex-
cept there shall not be taken into account any adjustment in respect to any taxable
year to which this section does not apply..."; that is, 1953. The statute allows, on
this basis, a taxpayer to deduct in the year in which a change in accounting method is
effected an amount equal to its 1953 accrual for the particular line item changed.
12. Treas. Reg. 1.481-3 (1959) has interpreted the analogous federal provision,
I.R.C. § 481(a):
If the adjustments required by section 481(a) and section 1.481-1 are attributa-
ble to a change in method of accounting which was not initiated by the taxpayer,
no portion of any adjustments which is attributable to pre-1954 Code years shall
be taken into account in computing taxable income. For example, if the total
adjustments inthe case of a change in method of accounting which is not
initiated by the taxpayer amounts to $10,000, of which $4,000 is attributable to
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or its federal counterpart, a change in the taxpayer's "method
of accounting" must be made. The issue was, therefore,
whether the change in Ladish's treatment of vacation pay
amounted to a change in its accounting method. Federal cases
have held that a change in accounting method includes a
change in the treatment of vacation pay accrual.' 3 Further-
more, the term "method of accounting" has been defined by
the federal regulations to include not only a complete overhaul
of the taxpayer's accounting method but also a change in the
treatment of a material item: "A change in method of account-
ing to which [I.R.C.] section 481 applies includes a change in
the over-all method of accounting for gross income or deduc-
tions, or a change in the treatment of a material item."" The
Wisconsin court adopted the federal approach and held that a
change in the manner of accounting for Ladish's vacation pay
was obviously a change in the treatment of a "material item."
An offset was thus allowed on Ladish's 1964 tax return for the
accrual of 1953 vacation pay.
The importance of the Ladish decision lies in its strict defi-
nition of "accrued" liability. In Wisconsin now, no matter how
certain the payment of an obligation may be, it will not be
deductible as an accrued liability unless all events which "fix
the amount of the taxpayer's liability. . . have come about or
occurred before the end of the tax year in which the deduction
was made."
The "all events" test raises a number of questions. Will
otherwise deductible services rendered or supplies delivered
before the end of the tax year be held nondeductible if their
price has not been set until the next calendar year?' 5 Is price
pre-1954 Code years, only $6,000 of the $10,000 total adjustment is required to
be taken into account under section 481 in computing taxable income. The
portion of the adjustment which is attributable to pre-1954 Code years is the
net amount of the adjustments which would have been required if the taxpayer
had changed his method of accounting in his first taxable year which began after
December 31, 1953 and ended after August 16, 1954. See section 481(b)(4)(A),
Reg. section 1.481-3.
The net effect of the Wisconsin statute is to allow the taxpayer an offsetting adjust-
ment in the year of a change in accounting method equal to the adjustment that would
have resulted if the change had occurred in 1954. That amount would be the 1953
accrual.
13. Oberman Mfg. Co., 47 T.C. 471 (1967), acq., 1967-2 C. B. 3; American Can Co.
v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2nd Cir. 1963).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.481-1(a)(1) (1959).
15. It would appear that services rendered or supplies delivered prior to year end,
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determination thus an event which could preclude satisfaction
of the "all events" test? Would a company's contribution to its
profit sharing pension fund after the close of its tax year be
nondeductible because it retained the right to revoke the plan
at any time, although the amount of the liability had otherwise
been determined?' 6 Is the nonhappening of an event, such as
not revoking a pension or profit-sharing plan, an event which
could prevent satisfaction of the "all events" test? These ques-
tions were not clearly answered in Ladish and should be consid-
ered when determining whether a liability has accrued in Wis-
consin.
I. INHERITANCE TAXATION OF JOINTLY-HELD PROPERTY
In Wisconsin, prior to 1972, an inheritance tax was auto-
matically assessed on the fractional interest of the survivors in
an amount determined by dividing the market value of the
property by the number of joint tenants at the time of death. 7
When the Wisconsin inheritance tax was amended in 1972,'1
Wisconsin adopted the federal approach to taxing jointly
owned property on death.'9
The amended survivorship statute, Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 72.12(6) (a), 20 provides that when an owner of property sub-
but not fixed as to price, probably would be deductible in the year of delivery as the
certainty of the obligation was fixed. However, it can be argued that an event, the
setting of the price, precluded fixing the "amount" of the liability prior to year end
and therefore the amount is not deductible.
16. See, Aunt Nellie's Foods, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 8 W.A.T.C. 264
(1971) (affirmed by Dane County Circuit Ct., August 19, 1971).
17. Wis. STAT. § 72.01(6) (1969).
18. 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 310.
19. See I.R.C. § 2040. Under this approach a tax is levided only on the deceased's
contributions to the joint tenancy.
20. Wis. STAT. § 72.12(6) (1973) reads:
(6) SURVIVORSHIP INTERESTS. (a)Rule. When property is held in the names
of 2 or more persons with the right of survivorship, upon the death of one of the
persons. Transfer of the full clear market value of the entire property is subject
to this subchapter.
(b) Exceptions. If the property or the consideration with which it was ac-
quired, or any part of either, is shown to have originally belonged to the survivor
and never to have been received or acquired by him from the decedent for less
than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, the transfer
of the property or the part originally furnished by the survivor is not taxed. If
the property was acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance by the decedent
and any other person, the taxable portion is determined by dividing the clear
market value of the property by the number of owners, unless the instrument
creating this ownership creates interests in a different proportion.
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ject to the right of survivorship dies, the entire value of the
jointly held property is subject to an inheritance tax, with only
two exceptions .2 The first exception, which is the basis of the
present controversy, exempts from inheritance taxation that
portion of the property which originally belonged to the survi-
vor and had not been "acquired by him from the decedent for
less than adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth .... "22
In re Estate of Kersten2 3 involved a petition by a widow for
redetermination of the inheritance tax payable on the estate of
her deceased husband. She claimed she had made significant
contributions in the form of personal services which constituted
consideration in money's worth and which had led to the ac-
quisition of the jointly held property in the estate. The widow
and her husband had spent all of their married lives operating
their family farm.24 Although there had never been any written
21. After In re Estate of Kersten, Wis. STAT. § 72.12(6) (a) was again amended. The
new statute reverted to the former practice of assessing an inheritance tax, when
jointly-owned property is involved, on the fractional interest of the survivors deter-
mined by dividing the property's market value by the number of joint tenants. 1975
Wis. Laws ch. 222. The new section states:
(6) SURVIVORSHIP INTERESTS. (a)General provision. When property is held in
the names of 2 or more persons with the right of survivorship but not as tenants
in common. Upon the death of one joint tenant, the right of the surviving joint
tenant or tenants to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of
such property shall be deemed a transfer taxable under this subchapter at the
property's clear market value.
(b) Joint tenancy exemption. When property is held in the names of 2 or
more persons with the right of survivorship, the following shall be subtracted
as provided in par. (c):
(1) The fractional interest of the survivor or survivors in property in an
amount determined by dividing the property's clear market value by the num-
ber of joint tenants, including the decedent, except as provided in subd. 2.
(c) Application of exemption. The amount determined in par. (b)2 shall be
subtracted from the amount determined under par. (a) prior to application of
the tax rates under s. 72.18. The amount determined in par. (b)1 shall be added
to the exemption allowzd under s. 72.17(1) to (3) and shall be applied to the
lowest tax bracket or brackets under s. 72.18. The remaining tax rates shall then
be applied to the balance of property, the transfer of which is taxable under this
subchapter, beginning at the tax rate applicable to the bracket in which the
exemptions end.
22. The other exception, provided in Wis. STAT. § 72.12(6)(b), which is not at issue
here, exempts from inheritance taxation property acquired by the decedent and the
survivor jointly by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance.
23. 71 Wis. 2d 757, 239 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
24. The petitioner was credited with maintaining the household, keeping the
books, training the calves, assisting with the milking and baling and generally assisting
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partnership agreement, the couple operated the farm as a team
and could not have done so without the help of the other. The
court faced two issues on appeal:
1. Did the wife's personal services in assisting with the farm
operation constitute consideration in "money or money's
worth" in return for her interest in the jointly held property?
2. If so, by what amount should the value of the jointly
owned property be reduced for inheritance tax purposes?
In addressing these issues the court defined "consideration
in money or money's worth" as "such consideration as is re-
duceable to a money value or is capable of being valued in
terms of money.125 The court noted the legislature's obvious
attempt to pattern section 72.12(6) after section 2040 of the
Internal Revenue Code which reflected a clear intent "to tax
the transfer of jointly-held property in the same manner as the
federal method. ' 2 Relying on a prior federal tax court case
with similar facts, the court thus held that the widow's con-
tinuing contribution in the way of service, industry and skills
to the operation of the farm constituted a contribution "in
money's worth" in the production of joint income which was
used to acquire the jointly held assets. 21
The court neatly avoided the question of valuating the
widow's services. It decided that once it had been found that
the services constituted adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth for the survivor's interest in the prop-
erty, it was not necessary to valuate those services. The value
of the jointly held property subject to inheritance tax should
be reduced to the extent of the survivor's fractional interest.
The widow was thus held to have contributed one-half of the
consideration for the jointly owned farm property.
The obvious question raised by Kersten in whether
domestic services performed by wives constitute contributions
on their part to jointly owned property. Application of the Wis-
consin definition of "consideration in money or money's worth"
could provide a persuasive argument that domestic services
constitute a contribution on the wife's part. Many domestic
services performed by wives could arguably be "reduceable to
in the operation of the farm. She twice ran the farm alone while her husband was sick.
25. 71 Wis. 2d at 763, 239 N.W.2d at 90.
26. 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 310 at 1246.
27. Estate of Everette Otte, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972).
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a money value" or are "capable of being valued in terms of
money," and, therefore, should logically constitute a contribu-
tion on a wife's part to jointly owned property. Whether
Kersten justifies this conclusion is questionable.
Kersten indicates that the construction given by the federal
courts to parallel federal provisions should be given considera-
ble weight. It appears fairly clear under federal interpretation
of section 2040, that the ordinary domestic services provided by
spouses do not constitute a contribution to jointly held prop-
erty. 2 Under the federal scheme, however, if a wife aids her
husband in his business under an agreement to share profits,
she generally will be deemed to have contributed part of the
consideration for the purchase price of property acquired with
the profits of the business. 29 Kersten has gone one step further
in not requiring any type of business agreement. In Kersten,
there was no partnership profit-sharing agreement, nor did
Mrs. Kersten ever report personal income for income tax or
social security purposes. The nature of her services, however,
as those in the federal cases, was recognized as primarily busi-
ness related.
As noted, Kersten specifically held that the wife's services
had contributed to the production of "joint income" which had
been used to acquire the jointly held assets. Generally, how-
ever, a wife's domestic services do not produce income with
which the couple purchases property. Kersten would, therefore,
have no precedential value for a case in which a spouse's contri-
bution was solely in the nature of domestic services. Due to
Wisconsin's expressed policy of following federal court con-
structions of parallel federal estate tax statutes, and since a
spouse's domestic services generally do not produce income, it
is doubtful whether Wisconsin will recognize a contribution
toward jointly held property for purely domestic or household
services provided by the surviving joint tenant."
III. GIFTS BY IMPLICATION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed and applied the
28. See Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 756 (1935); Estate of H.C. Loveland, 13 T.C. 5 (1949).
29. United States v. Neel, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Berkowitz v. Comm., 810
F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939). Cf. Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
30. Of course, given Wisconsin's reversion to the automatic inclusion approach,
this question may be moot in many cases.
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doctrine of "gift by implication" in In re Trust of Pauly.' The
doctrine of "gift by implication" 31 is "the ascertainment of the
intention of the testator from all the words used in the will in
the light of surrounding circumstances to fill in a void or an
omission in the expressed terms of the will."33 The doctrine is
one of three methods of judicial action used when a will's direc-
tions are not plain, explicit and capable of being readily fol-
lowed.
The sole goal in the transfer of property as directed by a will
is to carry out the expressed interest of the testator. Normally
this requires the mere following of the will's directions. How-
ever, in some wills the directions are incomplete, inconcise, or
contrary to the obvious intent of the testator. Problems are
generally in the nature of ambiguities,34 mistakes, 35 or omis-
sions.
The term "construction of the will" has been used in the
resolution of each of the above stated problems. 36 In Pauly, the
testatrix's will directed that her daughter receive trust income
31. 71 Wis. 2d 306, 237 N.W.2d 719 (1976).
32. The doctrine of gift by implication originated in Wisconsin in In re Donges's
Estate, 103 Wis. 497, 501, 79 N.W. 786, 787 (1899). According to Donges the doctrine
is the result of the application of three basic principles used in determining the inten-
tion of the testator:
First, that in case of doubt such construction will be adopted as to support and
give effect to the will, rather than to defeat it; second, that a testator is pre-
sumed to have intended a complete distribution of his estate, and a construction
tending to that end will be preferred to one which results in intestacy as to any
part.
33. Estate of MacLean, 47 Wis. 2d 396, 406, 177 N.W.2d 874, 879 (1970).
34. An ambiguity has been defined as "language in a will which is unclear and
requires judicial construction to determine its meaning." Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis.
2d 440, 459, 222 N.W.2d 885, 895 (1974) (Hansen J., dissenting). Justice Hansen's
analysis in his dissent in Connolly appears to have been adopted by the court in Pauly.
The Pauly decision not only delineated the differences between ambiguities and omis-
sions, but carefully pointed out that the analysis done by courts in deciding whether
or not to apply the doctrine of gift by implication was not "construction." Both of these
were key points in Justice Hansen's analysis.
35. Justice Hansen defined "mistake" as "a mistake in a will, as in matters of
identification of property or beneficiaries." Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis. 2d 440, 459,
222 N.W.2d 885, 895 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Will of Wehr, 36 Wis. 2d 154, 152 N.W.2d 868 (1967) (The court
"construed the will to determine the meaning of the ambiguously used word
'descendant'."); Estate of Gibbs, 14 Wis. 2d 490, 111 N.W.2d 413 (1961) (The court
corrected a mistake as to named legatee and referred to such reformation as construc-
tion); Estate of Maclean, 47 Wis. 2d 396, 177 N.W.2d 874 (1970) (The court applied
the doctrine of gift by implication and referred to it as a "construction" adopted to
give effect to the will).
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for life. If the daughter died before her son (the testatrix's
grandson) reached the age of thirty, the trust income was to be
paid equally to her son and daughter (the testatrix's grandchil-
dren) until the son reached thirty years of age. The trust would
then cease and the principal would be divided equally between
the brother and sister. However, the income beneficiary lived
past her son's thirtieth birthday and then outlived her daugh-
ter, who was survived only by her husband. The contingency
that the income beneficiary would die after her son attained
the age of thirty was not anticipated in the will. When the
income beneficiary renounced her income rights and assigned
all her interest in the trust res to her son, the trustee petitioned
court for "construction."
The court rejected the contention that the omission created
a reversionary interest in the testatrix and held that "the pro-
per course is to note that the provision is silent under the cir-
cumstances, and that the court may review the will to see if the
gap is filled by implication. 37 The court stressed that such
scrutiny was not "construction," and that the omission of a
circumstance was not an ambiguity of language.38 The critical
issue was whether the doctrine of gift by implication was appl-
icable.
The general scheme of the testatrix's will in Pauly provided
a means of ultimate disposition of the trust property if the
income beneficiary died before her son attained the age of
thirty. Applying the doctrine of gift by implication, the court
held that it was the testatrix's intent that the same order of
distribution be followed if the income beneficiary died after her
son reached age thirty. The income beneficiary was thus pre-
cluded from assigning the entire trust res to her son.
The doctrine of gift by implication may depend entirely
upon a judge's view as to whom the corpus should be distrib-
uted. It does, however, provide a method to rectify a drafting
oversight or to salvage imprecise wills which nevertheless ev-
ince an overall testamentary intent.
37. 71 Wis. 2d at 311, 237 N.W.2d at 722.
38. The entire Pauly opinion was consistent with Justice Hansen's analysis of the
difference between ambiguities, mistakes, and omissions in Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis.
2d 440, 222 N.W.2d 885 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
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IV. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Personal representatives are frequently given, by the dece-
dent, a power of sale over the estate property without court
authority. This power is a trust power not to be exercised with
arbitrary discretion or for the benefit of the personal represent-
ative.39 It has often been recognized that the personal repre-
sentative must act not only with good faith in the exercise of
this power, but also with loyalty to the beneficiaries of this
power." In re Estate of Meister" presented the question of
when a personal representative may be surcharged for negli-
gent exercise of his duty. The personal representative was
charged with negligent management and sale of the decedent's
Wisconsin real estate, all of which was income producing.
The court made clear that mere negligence on the part of
the personal representative will not expose him to personal
liability unless the beneficiaries prove a harm to the estate, i.e.,
either a loss in value of the estate property or loss of anticipated
profit by retaining the property. Most importantly, the court
voted that there could be no surchargeable loss if at the time
estate property was sold the sale was necessary for liquidity
purposes. This was precisely the situation in the case where the
evidence indicated that the decedent's real estate comprised
eighty percent of the estate's assets while the estate's cash
requirements equaled two-thirds of this amount.
JOHN L. SCHLIESMANN
TORTS
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The supreme court issued several significant opinions in the
area of products liability during its 1975 term. In Greiten v. La
Dow' the court once again attempted to isolate and clarify the
requirements for a cause of action sounding in negligence as
39. Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis. 2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966).
40. Estate of Van Epps, 40 Wis. 2d 139, 161 N.W.2d 278 (1968); McKeigue v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 130 Wis. 543, 110 N.W. 384 (1907).
41. 71 Wis. 2d 581, 239 N.W.2d 52 (1976).
1. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
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